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Summary 
QUESTIONS UNDER STUDY: The reimbursement system SwissDRG sets incentives for 
hospitals and providers to treat patients in a cost-efficient way. Arising conflicts between the 
commitment to the patient’s well-being and the economic interests of the hospital can lead to 
an impairment of quality and equity of health care. We developed and used a monitoring tool 
to evaluate ethically relevant aspects related to DRGs by surveying physicians.  
METHODS: We surveyed a random sample of physicians working in Swiss hospitals, 
exploring potentially positive and negative effects of DRGs on patient care.  
RESULTS: A total of 382 physicians completed the questionnaire (response rate 47%). More 
than 90% judged quality of health care “very good” or “rather good”, and 83% were satisfied 
with their job. The majority of physicians gave more consideration to economic issues in their 
clinical practise than they would have liked and had experienced various forms of over- and 
under-provision over the past six months. Overall, physicians considered patient-orientation 
deteriorating since the introduction of DRGs with no gains in efficiency. Professional 
principles could not be applied in all instances. 
CONCLUSIONS: Two years after the introduction of SwissDRG the quality of patient care 
and the job satisfaction is rated as good by most physicians. However, quality of care could be 
seriously compromised if more economic pressure is put on physicians in the future. Careful 
monitoring is needed to ensure that the needed focus on cost-containment and sustainability 
does not come at the expense of the high performance of the Swiss health care system.  
Key words: DRGs; ethics; cost-containment; conflicts of interest; quality of care, physicians; 
empirical; survey; questionnaire; Switzerland 
Introduction 
In 2012 Switzerland introduced several changes in its hospital financing system, of which the 
transition from different cantonal reimbursement systems (e.g., daily rates, fee-for-service 
elements or the All Patients Diagnosis-Related Groups (APDRG)) to a country-wide use of a 
single newly developed DRG System, the SwissDRG, was the most discussed. SwissDRG 
was developed on the basis of the German DRG system; however, in the Swiss system future 
investments are to be financed through the earnings from patient care, which is a paradigm 
shift from the German and also from the former Swiss financing practice [1–3]. Further 
changes included a new cost split for hospital care between the cantons and the insurers (new 
55:45 vs formerly 50:50) that will be fully implemented in 2017 with a transition period of 5 
years, and the obligation for cantons to plan hospital capacity in their area by listing hospitals 
that meet their infrastructure, economic, and quality of care requirements. Furthermore, the 
new legislation forbids subsidies and deficit guarantee for hospitals from the cantons. All 
these changes can be expected to result in higher economic pressure on each hospital and 
increased competition for patients.  
DRG-based prospective payments, which provide a fixed amount per patient based on 
diagnoses, procedures, and additional factors (such as age, severity of the condition and co-
morbidities or complications), set incentives for hospitals and providers to treat patients in a 
cost-efficient way, by focusing on a patient’s leading symptoms (that form the main diagnosis 
as defined at discharge) and by assuring a timely work-up and discharge while keeping down 
expenses. This means that for physicians, specific conflicts of interest may arise, mainly in 
terms of the commitment to the patient’s interests and well-being on one side and the 
consideration of the economic interests of the hospital and the “requirement of cost-effective 
medicine” on the other [4]. (Although conflicts of interest do arise in other reimbursement 
systems as well, the situation has changed in Switzerland with regard to (1.) an increased 
emphasis on economic considerations, at least in public, non profit-oriented hospitals and (2.) 
the concrete pattern of incentives for over- or under-provision, which differs from fee-for-
service or daily rate-based systems.) The persistence of such conflicts of interest can not only 
decrease job satisfaction and perceived autonomy of the physicians but can also lead to an 
impairment of quality and equity of health care [5–7]. 
A range of problematic potential consequences of DRG-based reimbursement have been 
projected early on, including “bloody exits”, case splitting, up-coding, and cherry picking of 
uncomplicated patients or those with diagnoses that come with a lucrative DRG code [8]. 
Monitoring of some relevant parameters, such as re-admission rates, seems not to have 
yielded an indication that quality of care has deteriorated in Switzerland with the introduction 
of DRGs [9]. However, there are two challenges to the assumption that everything is fine 
under DRGs: First, quality could be compromised in ways that are not picked up by standard 
measurement. Second, quality might not be affected because physicians hold up against the 
economic nudges and put their patients’ wellbeing first [6, 7]. 
Given that maintaining or improving quality and equity is a genuine concern to all health care 
systems, it would seem that thorough analyses of the effects of the DRG-based reimbursement 
system are considered urgently needed and highly desirable. Yet, so far there do not seem to 
be any monitoring tools in place that would address ethically relevant aspects in a 
comprehensive and sufficiently fine-grained way.  
To fill this gap we studied the impact of DRGs on patient care and professional practice as 
perceived by physicians. In our study we focused on perceived or expected ethical concerns 
such as conflicts of interest undermining patient care, limitations of professional autonomy, 
discrepancies between physicians’ ethical standards and their real life practise, and 
implications on work motivation and job satisfaction. For this study we have been drawing on 
results of an analysis of ethical issues raised in the context of DRGs [5, 6, 10] and the results 
of an earlier quantitative study in 2011/12 (manuscript in preparation).  
The study is embedded in a larger interdisciplinary research project “Assessing the Impact of 
DRGs on Patient Care and Professional Practice” (IDoC), supported by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF). The purpose of the project was to develop and apply a set of 
tools to monitor ethical concerns physicians encounter in their daily clinical work, to identify 
problematic areas in delivery of health care to hospital patients and to explore perceived 
changes – both positive and negative – following the introduction of DRGs.  
Table 1: Demographic data (n = 382).  
Age mean ± SD 37.5 ± 8.8 years 
Years of clinical activity as a physician mean ± SD 10.0 ± 7.7 years 
Years worked in hospitals in which services were (at least in 
part*) billed according to DRGs mean ± SD 4.1 ± 3.8 years 
Gender   
    Male 55% 
    Female 45% 
Most prevalent specialties   
    Internal medicine specialties 30% 
    Surgical specialties 23% 
    Anaesthesiology 12%  
    Other 35% 
Position   
    Assistant physician / resident 46%  
    Senior physician / fellow 33%  
    Chief physician or head of department  20%  
    Other   1%  
Hospital   
    Public  85% 
    Privately owned 11% 
    Not specified   4% 
Hospital size / level of care   
    University hospital 37% 
    Regional hospital with more than 9,000 patients per year 44% 
    Other hospital with ≤9,000 patients per year 16% 
    Not specified   3%  
* Before SwissDRG were introduced there was a great variety of reimbursement systems 
among Swiss hospitals including systems whose compensation was partially or fully based on 
DRGs. 
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also excluded affiliated physicians (“Belegärzte”) not employed by the hospitals who have 
specific contracts bearing different potential conflicts of interest than the employed 
physicians.  
Prior to the study we obtained ethical approval from the research ethics committees in those 
three cantons that required a review of the study.  
Questionnaire 
The four page questionnaire consisted of 16 simple or multi-unit questions; it can be 
downloaded from www.ethik.uzh.ch/ibme/forschung/drg/publications.html in its original 
German version as well as in a French and English translation. The French version was used 
in the French- and Italian-speaking cantons. The questionnaire was divided into five parts: (A) 
personal data, (B) working environment and future perspectives, (C) economic pressures in 
everyday clinical work (ten scenarios that capture situations in which patient care might be 
compromised for economic reasons, table 3), (D) increased focus on efficiency (seven items 
on different dimensions of efficiency [table 4, fig. 1]), (E) ethical position of physicians (eight 
items on moral principles, plus an additional item covering the tension between clinical and 
economic considerations [table 5, fig. 2]). As an example figure 2 presents a question 
belonging to part (C).  
This study was based on questions from an earlier survey of physicians in 2011/12 (data in 
preparation for publication). The current questionnaire includes items that have proven to 
work well during the first survey as well as refined questions and some new questions. By 
means of an analysis of relevant literature including similar surveys from Germany, own 
experiences of a team member in working with the German DRG system, and some preceding 
interviews of physicians, we developed a number of initial questions. These questions were 
scrutinised and selected with respect to its importance. It was piloted with 22 physicians. The 
questionnaire was developed in German and translated by a native French speaker. A member 
of our team translated the questionnaire back to German to disclose and resolve discrepancies. 
Data collection 
The questionnaires were sent out by mail with a cover letter explaining the goals of the survey 
and the anonymous data processing (i.e. questionnaires did not contain any code for 
identification of the respondents and the presentation of the results did not allow conclusions 
about individuals or institutions). The envelope also contained a return envelope and a 
postcard in case the recipients wished to state that they did not work with inpatients, belonged 
to a group that was excluded from the survey, or did not want to participate in the study. 
The questionnaire was first sent out in July 2013, with reminders following in August and 
September. To set an incentive for participation we used a total of 300 book vouchers worth 
20 CHF each when sending out reminders.  
Statistical analysis 
Data is expressed as the mean and standard deviation (SD) for continuous variables and as the 
frequency for nominal variables. The overall direction towards increased or decreased time 
allocation for six activities was tested using the binomial test. With the same test statistical 
significance of the direction towards higher or lower efficiency of work processes under the 
new reimbursement system was examined. To compare the assessment of the ideal with the 
current work situation (see fig. 2) the sign test was used. A p-value ≤0.05 was considered 
statistically significant. SPSS Statistics 20 (IBM, Armonk, USA) was used for statistical 
analysis. 
Table 2: Changes in working time allocation for certain activities since the introduction of 
SwissDRG in 2012 (n = 382).  
Activities Significantly less Less Equal More 
Significantly 
more
Don't 
know 
p-
value*
Time for 
administrative 
tasks 
1%   2% 36% 32% 20%   9% p <0.0001
Time for 
communication 
within the care 
team 
2% 15% 67%   5%   1%   9% p <0.0001
Time for 
communication 
with patients and 
relatives 
4% 21% 64%   2%   0%   9% p <0.0001
Time for own 
training / 
education 
5% 22% 63%   1%   1%   9% p <0.0001
Time for training 
of young 
colleagues 
5% 23% 60%   0%   1% 11% p <0.0001
Overtime  1%   1% 53% 28%   8% 10% p <0.0001
* Binomial test of the overall direction of changes in time allocation. 
Table 3: Economic pressure in everyday clinical work (n = 382).  
  
How often have you experienced this 
situation in the last 6 months in your 
hospital?
  
Situations in everyday 
clinical work 
Currently 
I sense 
pressure 
in this 
respect
At least 
once a 
day 
At least 
once a 
week 
At least 
once a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Question 
does not 
apply to 
me 
(1) A measure useful to the 
patient was not executed 
because of cost-related 
reasons, or substituted by a 
less expensive and also less 
effective medical procedure. 
18%   3% 17% 17% 27% 36% – 
(2) For a patient with various 
diagnostic and therapeutic 
options, a riskier option was 
chosen for cost reasons. 
  5%   1%   4%   5% 14% 65% 11% 
(3) A medical procedure was   8%   5% 10% 15% 19% 52% – 
applied for economic reasons 
although it was not medically 
necessary. 
(4) I decide for or against a 
medical intervention because 
management urged me to for 
economic reasons. If I could 
have decided in the interest 
of the patient, I would have 
chosen a different medical 
procedure.  
14%   3% 11% 17% 18% 44%   7% 
(5) I attend to more patients 
than I am able to with due 
care.  
14% 11% 19% 18% 19% 34% – 
(6) Certain patients are not 
admitted to the hospital 
because they represent a 
financial risk (e.g. multi-
morbid patients; patients 
with a less lucrative DRG). 
  7%   1%   3%   4% 12% 65% 13% 
(7) Patients are discharged 
too early due to DRG-limited 
length of stay. 
12%   4% 13% 14% 19% 36% 13% 
(8) Patients are not 
discharged although it would 
be medically justifiable, as 
the minimum length of stay 
has not yet been reached. 
11%   6% 15% 13% 16% 35% 15% 
(9) To increase 
reimbursement, patients are 
admitted to hospital although 
a treatment as outpatients 
would be appropriate. 
12%   4% 14% 14% 16% 36% 14% 
(10) For economic reasons, 
patients are admitted more 
than once, for a treatment 
that could have been 
completed in the first stay. 
  8%   2%   7% 15% 17% 40% 17% 
Table 4: An increased focus on efficiency (n = 382).  
  
Current situation Since the beginning of the year 2012 
Ver
y 
goo
d 
Rathe
r good 
Rathe
r poor 
Ver
y 
poor
I 
don't 
kno
w 
Improve
d  
Unchange
d 
Decrease
d 
I 
don't 
kno
w  
p-
value*
> The 
coordinatio
n and/or 
sequence of 
diagnostic 
  9% 67% 16% 3%   6% 10% 61%   8% 21% p = 0.33 
and 
therapeutic 
measures 
> Discharge 
managemen
t 
  8% 59% 19% 4% 11% 13% 42% 19% 26% p = 0.037 
> 
Cooperatio
n with the 
pre- or 
post-
admission 
care units 
  8% 61% 19% 2% 10% 10% 58%   8% 24% p = 0.33 
> Overall 
cooperation 
of the 
treatment 
team 
14% 71%   8% 1%   6%   3% 69%   8% 20% p = 0.003 
> Patient 
oriented 
care 
15% 63% 13% 3%   6%   3% 52% 24% 20% 
p 
<0.000
1 
> Quality 
awareness 
among 
suppliers 
13% 68% 12% 3%   5%   8% 64% 10% 19% p = 0.33 
> 
Admission 
only if 
outpatient 
care for the 
patient is 
not 
sufficient  
16% 54% 15% 3% 12%   6% 51% 17% 26% 
p 
<0.000
1 
* Binomial test of the direction of change (improvement or decrease). 
Results 
Demographic data 
We received 1048 addresses from the FMH database to form a representative sample. A total 
of 230 physicians were excluded for following reasons: 27 invalid mail addresses; 176 
physicians claimed not to be working with inpatients anymore; 18 physicians, mainly 
psychiatrists, were not working with DRGs; and 9 were affiliated physicians. Thus the final 
study population consisted of 818 Swiss physicians working with inpatients. A total of 382 
physicians filled in the questionnaire (response rate 47%). A total of 80% of the returned 
questionnaires were in German, and the remaining questionnaires were in French. This 
corresponds to the geographic distribution of addresses in German and French/Italian 
speaking cantons in the sample (81% vs 19%) we had received from the FMH. The socio-
demographic characteristics of the sample are shown in table 1. 
Of the 202 non-respondents, 34 physicians had indicated on the postcard that they did not 
want to participate in the study. In this subgroup, 47% were male and 50% female, their mean 
age was 38.7 ± 8.0 years. There were no significant differences between age and gender 
distribution between these non-respondents and study participants.  
Working environment and future perspectives  
Overall, 32% of study participants assessed the quality of patient care in their department as 
very good and 60% as good. Only 6% of the respondents thought that the quality was poor, 
2% thought it was very poor, and 1% did not know. 
Asked about their job satisfaction in the last six months, 24% of the physicians were “very 
satisfied”, 59% “satisfied”, 15% “dissatisfied”, and 2% “very dissatisfied”. Additionally, 82% 
of those who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their present working conditions were 
currently considering changing their job or reducing their working hours at the hospital 
because of their dissatisfaction, 12% were not considering that, and 6% did not know. 
No one stated that their job satisfaction had improved since January 2012 because of the 
DRG-based hospital financing. The majority judged their job satisfaction had remained 
unchanged (56%), a considerable percentage reported a decrease (29%) and 15% did not feel 
qualified to make a statement. 
We also asked physicians if there was enough time for communication between care team and 
physicians in their department. Half of the respondents agreed (53%), 19% strongly agreed, 
19% disagreed 8% did not know and nobody strongly disagreed. 
Effects of change of the reimbursement system 
Table 2 shows the subjective assessment of study participants regarding changes in how they 
allocated their working hours for defined activities since the introduction of SwissDRG in 
2012. Half of the physicians thought they spent more time on administrative tasks since the 
new hospital financing system had been introduced. In addition, 25% of the physicians said 
they had less time for communication with patients and relatives and for their own continuous 
education, as well as for the training of young colleagues. A third of the physicians stated they 
were working more overtime than before the introduction of DRG. All reported changes were 
statistically significant. 
Economic pressure in clinical work 
In this section we present ten different scenarios that refer to often discussed apprehensions or 
consequences of DRGs (table 3). Study participants were asked, had they experienced these 
scenarios in their hospital and/or had they sensed economic pressure in this respect over the 
past six months.  
Almost two-thirds of physicians (64%) stated that at least once over the past six months a 
useful medical intervention was not carried out because of cost, or was substituted by a 
cheaper but less effective measure (situation 1). 18% indicated they currently felt pressure to 
act in this way. Situations 2 to 7 capture other aspects of compromised patient care: Exposing 
patients to unnecessary risks was seen by almost a quarter (23%) at least once in the past six 
months (situation 2), overtreatment and decisions against the patient’s interest for economic 
reasons (situation 3 and 4) by almost half (49%), work overload with inadequate level of 
diligence by 66% (situation 5), refusal of patients by 20% (situation 6), and too early hospital 
discharge by 49% (situation 7).  
Beyond overtreatment the study revealed further forms of waste (delayed discharge; hospital 
admission for care that could have been delivered in outpatient setting; case splitting with 
repeated admissions; cf. situations 8 to 10 in table 3). Half of the study participants had 
experienced that patients were kept longer in the hospital only to reach the DRG-specific 
minimum length of stay at least once over the past six months. Additionally, 49% of 
respondents had seen patients being admitted to hospital although outpatient setting would 
have been appropriate (situation 9), and 42% of the respondents had experienced case 
splitting (situation 10).  
Some physicians indicated that the questions did not apply to them. These physicians were 
likely not involved in admitting or discharging patients, such as anaesthetists, or were 
physicians working relatively autonomously regarding their clinical decisions (situation 4). 
The choice “does not apply to me” was not given for items which we considered as being 
encountered by all physicians treating inpatients (situations 1, 3 and 5). 
An increased focus on efficiency 
In order to capture the projected positive consequences of DRGs, we dedicated a section of 
the questionnaire to effects on efficiency of work processes and on perceived relation of any 
changes following the introduction of DRGs (table 4, fig. 1).  
Overall, efficiency was considered to be rather good by the majority of respondents. At the 
same time, respondents noted little improvement with DRGs; most considered the status quo 
unchanged. For some items – discharge management, cooperation of the treatment team, 
patient-oriented care, and hospital admission only for patients who could not be treated 
adequately in an outpatient clinic – the majority considered the situation unchanged or didn’t 
know and those who considered the situation worse under DRGs exceeded the number of 
those who saw an improvement.  
Ethical position of physicians 
Study participants were asked to assess the relevance of eight moral principles (A–H) that 
related to their work as physicians, and the extent to which they were able to comply with 
them in their daily work (see table 5). Primacy of the wellbeing of the patient (A), treatment 
according to best available standards (B), respect for patient autonomy (F) and treating all 
patients with equal care (G) stand out as being considered “very relevant” by most physicians 
(>80%). By contrast, only a third of the respondents rated the principle “As a physician I 
strive for cost-effective treatment so that everyone can receive medical care” as very 
important; half of the respondents rated this principle as “important”. 
More than half of the study participants thought moral principles might at best be realised 
with limitations. This means that physicians cannot fully adhere to the moral principles they 
deem important in their own clinical work. Taking sufficient time to develop a good 
physician-patient-relationship, maintaining professional autonomy, good cooperation within 
the treatment team and heeding cost-efficiency in the interest of a sustainable public health 
system were considered to be challenging or impossible to implement by more than 75% of 
respondents.  
To investigate the tension between two professional principles we asked the physicians to 
quantify the following two considerations in their everyday clinical decision-making (fig. 2): 
Striving to achieve the best possible medical outcome for their patients versus considering the 
economic interests of their department. We asked study participants to assign a value to both 
principles on an 11–point Likert scale (A) for their current job and (B) for their personal ideal 
situation. Mean value of the answers related to the current job was 5.5 (SD 2.4); slightly over 
the balance point of 5, meaning they gave economic considerations and their patients’ 
interests equal weight, with a small bias towards their patients’ interests. Mean value of the 
answers related to the ideal situation was 7.7 (SD 1.8) and therefore tended more towards 
patient interests. 
Table 5: Moral principles for physicians – relevance and realisability [percentages], n = 382. 
Principals 
Relevance Feasibility
Very 
importa
nt 
Importa
nt 
Less 
importa
nt 
Unimporta
nt 
Easily 
realisab
le 
Realisabl
e with 
limitatio
ns
Difficu
lt to  
realise 
Completel
y 
unrealisab
le 
A) The 
health 
status of 
the patient 
is top 
priority for 
a 
physician’
s action. 
87% 12%   1% 0% 38% 56%   5% 2% 
B) As a 
physician I 
treat my 
patients 
according 
to the 
highest 
current 
medical 
standards.  
82% 16%   2% 0% 41% 53%   5% 1% 
C) As a 
physician I 
take 
sufficient 
time to 
build a 
good 
relationshi
p with my 
patients 
and take 
their 
psychosoci
al 
64% 31%   4% 1% 14% 51% 31% 4% 
condition 
into 
account.  
D) As a 
physician I 
am able to 
make 
independe
nt 
decisions 
regarding 
the type 
and extent 
of services 
I offer to 
the patient 
based on 
medical 
criteria.  
51% 45%   5% 0% 23% 61% 14% 3% 
E) As a 
physician I 
strive for 
cost-
effective 
treatment 
so that 
everyone 
can 
receive 
medical 
care.  
33% 53% 14% 0% 15% 65% 18% 2% 
F) As a 
physician I 
inquire 
about and 
respect the 
will of the 
patients.  
85% 14%   1% 0% 51% 44%   5% 1% 
G) As a 
physician I 
treat all 
my 
patients 
with equal 
diligence.  
81% 17%   2% 0% 44% 47%   7% 2% 
H) As a 
physician I 
am 
committed 
to good 
58% 37%   5% 0% 20%* 64%* 15%* 2%* 
cooperatio
n between 
all medical 
profession
s in patient 
care.  
The total percentage may not equal 100 due to rounding. 
Discussion 
Summary of main findings 
This cross-sectional survey of physicians in Swiss hospitals showed that under SwissDRG 
conditions the general quality of patient care is perceived to be good or rather good and 
despite financial pressure, work satisfaction is (still) high; two findings that are consistent 
with other studies [11, 12]. However, our study identified a number of issues that might 
undermine the best possible quality, equity and efficiency of patient care in future. 
A significant number of physicians have experienced situations in the recent past that indicate 
important impairments to patient care, such as looking after more patients than they are able 
to with due care, withholding an intervention that would have been useful or replacing it by a 
cheaper but less effective one, or discharging patients too early. However, there are not only 
certain forms of underprovision, but also elements of overprovision or waste, such as keeping 
patients in hospital for longer than medically required or treating them in hospital – rather 
than in an ambulatory setting. 
These findings challenge the declared goals of SwissDRG to discourage unnecessary care and 
to promote an overall increase in efficiency of health care services [13]. We investigated 
seven aspects of efficiency – among them coordination of diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures, discharge management, and cooperation of teams – and did not find any 
improvement. However, every third physician said that the level of patient oriented care has 
decreased, which is particularly deplorable given that patient-orientation is a marker of good 
quality health care and that it helps to avoid unnecessary cost. Half of the physicians spent 
more time in administrative tasks, one third reported more overtime, and one quarter 
dedicated less time to medical training of young colleagues and to their own continuous 
education. These factors may contribute to the finding that one out of three physicians who 
felt qualified to compare the situation pre and post introduction of DRGs, thought that their 
job satisfaction has decreased with DRGs, while not a single physician noticed an 
improvement. 
Strengths and limitations  
In our study the random sample of physicians and the response rate of 47% enable a transfer 
of the results, the latter however limits the representativeness of the data. The gender 
distribution among study participants was comparable to the data of the Swiss Federal 
Statistics Office from 2011 (54% male and 46% female physicians working in hospitals) [14]. 
The mean age of the physicians working with inpatients was slightly younger as compared to 
the statistics 2012 of the Swiss Medical Association – FMH (43.1 years compared to 37.5 
years in our sample) [15]. These are the only indications that we obtained a quite 
representative sample but one should consider that our target population excluded some 
physicians not working with DRGs or without making clinical decisions for patients, so the 
comparison of the demographic data with official statistics has limitations. 
Another limitation is the subjective assessments of physicians that may depart from real 
effects. Some data, like the increase in overtime, may be verified from objective sources. 
Other findings are inherently subjective, such as the perceived gap between an ideal situation 
and the clinical reality. To explore such issues further, qualitative approaches would be a 
valuable addition. Our study is limited to a retrospective and subjective comparison of pre-
post situations. Although another survey was performed just before the introduction of DRGs 
(manuscript in preparation), it differs in sampling, and due to its timing may not provide a 
genuine baseline that would allow for a proper pre-post comparison. Therefore no 
independent pre-data were available to compare directly to the data of 2013. 
Comparison with existing literature 
In 2011, 2012, and 2013, the Swiss Medical Association commissioned three surveys of 
physicians. Some of their data was comparable to ours [9, 12]. The answers to work 
satisfaction were similar (FMH versus our data in 2013): 22% vs 24% “very satisfied” and 
60% vs 59% “satisfied”. This is important, as work satisfaction may in turn affect the ability 
to deliver high quality patient care. Similar to ours, the FMH study found an increase in 
overtime in 2013 compared to 2012 but no difference to 2011. Furthermore, the FMH study 
found an increase in administrative work – the mean time spent on medical documentation 
and reports rose from 86 to 104 minutes per day within two years. Compared to previous 
years the 2013 FMH survey yielded a lower number of physicians who stated that all 
diagnostic procedures needed to make a treatment decision were in fact performed; every 
third physician thought that patient care was compromised by high workload or time pressure 
and perceived attempts to transfer multi-morbid or chronically ill patients to other hospitals 
[9].  
In hospitals fighting for economic survival, management could urge physicians to change 
their practice of medicine to cut cost, thus placing them in a strong conflict of interest [16, 
17]. In the absence of a close and comprehensive monitoring system, such increased focus on 
economic parameters could come at the expense of the quality and equity of care provided. 
Even now some of our study participants reported pressure in varying respects and noted that 
they give economic considerations more weight compared to patients’ interests than they 
would like.  
In Germany, the perspective of physicians on the introduction of the DRG system has been 
investigated by several studies [18, 19], among them a longitudinal study with physicians 
working in hospitals in Hesse within the WAMP project (Wandel in Medizin und Pflege im 
DRG-System, surveys carried out between 2004 and 2007) [20]. Similar to our study, some 
indications for a compromised quality of patient care were found, for example increased 
occurrences of lack of time, of burdensome decisions made by physicians, and of failure to 
complete the assigned workload as well as a decreased use of the best available interventions. 
Many German physicians and experts are dissatisfied with the current state attributed to 
DRGs and to insufficient funding of the health care system, and some of them wish to 
abandon this reimbursement system [16, 21]. They claim that under the current DRG system 
hospitals do not have enough resources to pay for operating expenses, adapt innovations or 
invest in new infrastructure. A recent study supports this notion: The “Hospital Barometer” is 
an annual representative survey of German hospitals on behalf of the hospital operators of the 
German Hospital Institute (Deutsches Krankenhaus Institut). It showed that by 2013 more 
than half of the hospitals were making losses; compared to earlier years this number increased 
considerably (2011: 21%, 2012: 31%) [22–24]. Although there is still sufficient funding 
available for health care delivery in Switzerland and the issues seen in Germany may not 
materialise, it is important to be aware of issues that may arise if the level of funding is 
decreased. 
If patients became more aware of the potential tension between economic considerations and 
the quality of care delivered to them, a loss of trust in the system and in physicians may result. 
Patients may question their physicians’ advice because they are uncertain whether their 
physician acts in their best interest or in the economic interest of the hospital. This point was 
made at a recent symposium “The doctor-patient relationship in the shadow of the market” in 
Berlin, where health experts stated that a system that over-stresses efficiency puts the 
physician-patient relationship at risk and eventually results in de-professionalisation of the 
medical profession [25]. 
There are very few physician surveys from other countries investigating the impact of the 
DRG system on patient care that our study could be compared to [26–28]. Only cross-
sectional studies, but no longitudinal studies that would allow for pre-post comparisons, were 
found in the literature. A Norwegian study with 1298 physicians was conducted four years 
after the introduction of the DRG system in 2002. It found some indications that physicians 
assessed quality of medical work worse than before the reform and half of the physicians felt 
that the hospital reform had mainly had a negative impact on hospitals [26]. A study from the 
USA included 33 physicians working in hospital one year after introduction of the DRG 
system in the 1980s. Their responses and comments were dominated by complaints and 
criticisms aimed at efforts at cost-containment seen as potential threat to appropriate patient 
care and their own professional autonomy [28], a theme that has come up in our own study as 
well. 
Implications for future research 
Each change of a hospital financing system needs to be monitored to assess if quality of 
health care was compromised and if core ethical values such as fair access to health care were 
guaranteed. A survey of health professionals should be a central component of such 
monitoring as well as linking such data to other administrative hospital data, patient data, and 
other studies with validated and established instruments allowing international comparisons. 
Despite the huge majority of Swiss physicians attesting the health care system as good quality 
there are some indications that quality could be seriously compromised if more economic 
pressure is put on physicians in future. The reported forms of under- and overtreatment need 
to be further investigated, and the conflicts of interest minimised through suitable governance 
and management strategies in hospitals. The physician questionnaire developed for our survey 
can help identify possible problem areas in clinical practise, thus contributing to further 
development of SwissDRG and to the ongoing evaluation of the most recent health care 
reform.  
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